Agents of Discord: How Congressional Leaders Manage Intraparty Conflict
Following months of negotiations between the Trump White House and congressional Republicans, and after a series of tense votes in both chambers, the GOP’s effort to repeal the Affordable Care Act came to a sputtering halt on the Senate floor. Despite having campaigned for years against Barack Obama’s signature domestic accomplishment, Republican lawmakers were deeply divided when presented the opportunity to propose a substitute. Nevertheless, Republican leaders in the House and Senate scheduled — and then rescheduled — votes that laid bare their party’s ideological divisions and set opposing wings of the coalition against one another. To understand why leaders might behave in this way, we must rethink what we know about how they seek to manage their coalitions.
Drawing on the personal papers of majority and minority party leaders in both chambers since the turn of the last century, this book project endeavors to understand when and why congressional leaders will act as agents of discord. While scholars typically view majority and minority party leaders as agents of party cohesion — working to disguise members’ divergent preferences by tabling or otherwise undermining proposals that divide the party — they have been slower to acknowledge their capacity to strategically exacerbate and exploit dissent within their respective coalitions. Indeed, while classic studies of Congress uniformly agree that leaders benefit from party homogeneity and strive for unity, this book begins with the observation that leaders have often sought to stoke or amplify intraparty conflict. Here, I seek to examine why and how leaders undertake to divide the party — or at least promote, sometimes subtly, the efforts of those who do.
Following months of negotiations between the Trump White House and congressional Republicans, and after a series of tense votes in both chambers, the GOP’s effort to repeal the Affordable Care Act came to a sputtering halt on the Senate floor. Despite having campaigned for years against Barack Obama’s signature domestic accomplishment, Republican lawmakers were deeply divided when presented the opportunity to propose a substitute. Nevertheless, Republican leaders in the House and Senate scheduled — and then rescheduled — votes that laid bare their party’s ideological divisions and set opposing wings of the coalition against one another. To understand why leaders might behave in this way, we must rethink what we know about how they seek to manage their coalitions.
Drawing on the personal papers of majority and minority party leaders in both chambers since the turn of the last century, this book project endeavors to understand when and why congressional leaders will act as agents of discord. While scholars typically view majority and minority party leaders as agents of party cohesion — working to disguise members’ divergent preferences by tabling or otherwise undermining proposals that divide the party — they have been slower to acknowledge their capacity to strategically exacerbate and exploit dissent within their respective coalitions. Indeed, while classic studies of Congress uniformly agree that leaders benefit from party homogeneity and strive for unity, this book begins with the observation that leaders have often sought to stoke or amplify intraparty conflict. Here, I seek to examine why and how leaders undertake to divide the party — or at least promote, sometimes subtly, the efforts of those who do.
