Divided Parties, Strong Leaders
To hear congressional leaders tell it, a divided party is never good. Political scientists tend to agree. Leaders, the thinking goes, have little to gain — and much to lose — from intraparty fights. The more disagreement between members, the less power leaders can wield. For majority party leaders, infighting makes it difficult to rack up legislative victories that members can campaign on. For minority party leaders, infighting makes it harder to persuade voters that their team would do better than the bums in charge. Given these dynamics, legislative scholars typically conclude that both majority and minority party leaders aim to “keep peace in the family,” facilitating action on shared priorities and sitting tight when conflict is likely.
All of this makes good sense. And yet, intraparty battles are not inherently limiting; nor is it the case that leaders of divided parties necessarily work at a disadvantage. To be sure, it is easier — and likely preferable — to lead a united party. But the central argument of this book is that majority and minority party leaders in both chambers can turn intraparty warfare to their advantage, using it to undercut rival claimants for power, discredit policy interventions they oppose, consolidate their authority, and preserve favorable status quos. Moving behind the frontlines of intraparty fights, this book will show that party leaders can arm — overtly or covertly — one side or the other. They can also set the terms of engagement, dictating the rules of combat and the venues where it will take place. So too they can determine the conflict’s duration, whether by compelling one side to sue for peace, insisting that both camps negotiate a truce, or permitting the battle to rage on. Taken together, these actions allow leaders to influence how intraparty fights take shape and are resolved.
To hear congressional leaders tell it, a divided party is never good. Political scientists tend to agree. Leaders, the thinking goes, have little to gain — and much to lose — from intraparty fights. The more disagreement between members, the less power leaders can wield. For majority party leaders, infighting makes it difficult to rack up legislative victories that members can campaign on. For minority party leaders, infighting makes it harder to persuade voters that their team would do better than the bums in charge. Given these dynamics, legislative scholars typically conclude that both majority and minority party leaders aim to “keep peace in the family,” facilitating action on shared priorities and sitting tight when conflict is likely.
All of this makes good sense. And yet, intraparty battles are not inherently limiting; nor is it the case that leaders of divided parties necessarily work at a disadvantage. To be sure, it is easier — and likely preferable — to lead a united party. But the central argument of this book is that majority and minority party leaders in both chambers can turn intraparty warfare to their advantage, using it to undercut rival claimants for power, discredit policy interventions they oppose, consolidate their authority, and preserve favorable status quos. Moving behind the frontlines of intraparty fights, this book will show that party leaders can arm — overtly or covertly — one side or the other. They can also set the terms of engagement, dictating the rules of combat and the venues where it will take place. So too they can determine the conflict’s duration, whether by compelling one side to sue for peace, insisting that both camps negotiate a truce, or permitting the battle to rage on. Taken together, these actions allow leaders to influence how intraparty fights take shape and are resolved.
